Search and Seizure—Warrant Based on Information Obtained by Fraud by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 2 
January 1933 
Search and Seizure—Warrant Based on Information Obtained by 
Fraud 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Search and Seizure—Warrant Based on Information Obtained by Fraud, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 171 (1933). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss2/16 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
holding hearings whether or not he should honor a rendition demand for an
alleged fugitive from justice are absolutely privileged. Brown v. Globe
Printing Co. (1908) 213 Mo. 611, 112 S. W. 462 (even though the governor is
under no legal duty to act no matter what he find. Kentucky v. Dennison
(1861) 24 How. 66). The courts have disagreed whether the same doctrine
should be applied to pardon proceedings. Andrews v. Gardiner (1918) 224
N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (not applied); Connellee v. Blanton (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 163 S. W. 404 (applied). The announced test in all these cases is
whether or not the official or board in question has the attributes of a court
even though it is not part of the regular judicial hierarchy. As was pointed
out in the principal case it is not enough that the official be empowered to
hold hearings and commanded to exercise judicial discretion. His decisions
must be such that they directly affect individual rights.
The decision in the present case seems justified. If absolute privilege is
essential to the administration of justice in regular courts, it is just as es-
sential in proceedings before administrative officials when their decision af-
fects individual rights just as directly and bindingly as the decision of a
court. G. W. S., '33.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WARRANT BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED BY
FRAD.-Two prohibition agents were admitted to a lodgeroom of the Fra-
ternal Order of Eagles on the representation that they were members in good
standing of a distant lodge of the same organization. This was false. The
cards and receipts produced on request prior to admission had been taken
from other lodges without the consent or knowledge of any of the officers or
members thereof. After the agents were admitted they were served with
intoxicating liquor for which they paid. No physical search was made of the
rooms at the time, the agents contenting themselves with observing all that
could be seen from their table. Several days later they applied for a search
warrant, using what they had seen to constitute the probable cause necessary
for its issuance. A search warrant, regular on its face, was issued and the
liquor then in the lodgerooms seized thereunder. Held, the information se-
cured by the deceptive entry was illegally obtained and therefore the subse-
quent search and seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. U. S. (C. C. A. 3, 1932)
57 F. (2d) 93.
It has become settled that evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
by Federal officers cannot be used if timely objection is made. Weeks V.
U. S. (1913) 232 U. S. 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S. (1919) 251
U. S. 385; Gould v. U. S. (1921) 255 U. S. 298; Amos v. U. S. (1921) 255
U. S. 313. The majority in the present case cite these four cases alone as
supporting their decision. Unfortunately their fact situations are so dif-
ferent that they should give but little comfort to the Court. In all four of
these cases the original search and seizure was without any attempt to pro-
cure a warrant of any kind. The Silverthorne case is the most analogous,
for in that the officers took the papers, made copies, and then returned them.
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Later a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the corporation to force the
production of the papers to be used against its officers. Under such circum-
stances, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court considered that the whole
thing was a mere scheme to evade the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.
These cases decide that the officials must not gain entry to make an immediate
search and seizure by means of force, fraud, or the like. The principal case
expands this doctrine by ruling that the afliants of probable cause must not
gain entry to secure their knowledge by such means. However, the ma-
jority should not be blamed too severely for citing cases which do not prove
as much as they desire, since there seem to be no prior cases which have gone
as far as this case. The court bolsters its reasoning from the authorities by
arguing that although there was no seizure after the illegal entry, there
was a search. The agents "searched with their eyes" and thus the liquor
was "illegally seen". This view merely assumes the point under dispute,
i. e. that an officer who is in a place where he would not be had he disclosed
his identity cannot use anything he sees as the basis for a search warrant.
The Court also urges that the subsequent search and seizure under the war-
rant was based on the fraudulent entry and that the whole transaction is to
be considered as a single act.
Judge Buffington in his dissenting opinion presented all the arguments
which can be used against the position of the majority. Historically, the
Fourth Amendment was inserted as a result of the fear and hatred of the
searches and seizures made by the British revenue officers in the colonies
under warrants issued to them in blank and without hearing, to be filled in
by them as their whim or malevolence might direct. The Fourth Amend-
ment must be interpreted in the light of the evils which it was designed to
remedy. Carrol v. U. S. (1925) 267 U. S. 132. The basic vice of the earlier
system was that the warrants were issued without probable cause shown to
the magistrate. "On the point as to where and how the afliants of probable
cause should get their information, the Constitution is silent, so that the
protection of the Eagles Clubs thus sought is, so to speak, not intraconstitu-
tional but extraconstitutional." Such a holding as that of the principal case
is a great boon to the criminal classes. It confers on them a great measure of
immunity from such federal statutes as can only be enforced by evidence se-
cured by under-cover agents. True the agents themselves might testify on
the trial of the accused, but the government would be forced to do without
the far more convincing evidence afforded by producing the liquor itself be-
fore the jury. It would seem that the present case carries the protection
of individual rights to such an extent as seriously to hamper the enforce-
ment of the rights of the general public. S. M., '34.
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